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ulus’ (children hear relatively few sen-
tences to gether the amount of grammati-
cal-structural information they do), or the
childhood ‘critical period’ for learning a
language (to become language users, chil-
dren must experience a language before
age six or so). If children apply statistical
learning to most social phenomena, and
such learning can explain language-learn-
ing as well, who needs a separate learning
modality for language?
Problem Cases
Beyond Human Nature is most cogent on
the facets of behavior that have inspired
strong empirical research: intelligence and
gender – subjects which are inextricably
tied up with values of freedom and equality.
The book becomes shakier when discussing
mental illness and innate knowledge, if
partly because, unlike gender and intelli-
gence, these are not traits or capacities, so
it is more challenging to pin down precisely
what one is asserting to be innate (or not).
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since Chomsky attacked B.F. Skinner’s
Verbal Behavior (1957) and presented the
popular theory of an innate universal
grammar. However, linguists, psycholo-
gists, and philosophers have uncovered dif-
ficulties an innate grammar view has in
accounting for certain findings. For exam-
ple, children seem to apply ‘statistical
learning procedures’ to all kinds of tasks,
such as “learning the sequence of muscle
movements required for physical skills”
(p.141). Yet statistical learning seems to
explain many phenomena that Chomsky
says typify language-learning’s uniqueness
just as well as an innate grammar theory
does; for instance, the ‘poverty of the stim-
THE DEBATE AS TO WHAT
extent genes or environ-
ment determines us rages
on. As Jesse Prinz points
out in this lively, well-documented book,
the controversy between nature and nur-
ture dates back at least to Plato and Aristo-
tle in the Fourth Century BC. Since the
Nineteenth Century, when both biological
inheritance and culture were first thought
about scientifically, the sciences have taken
up the debate, from the Nineteenth Cen-
tury nativist psychologists, to the half-cen-
tury of behaviorism in the Twentieth.
Since the 1960s, the majority view has
been ‘it’s in our genes’. Popular naturist
(sic) books, such as those by Stephen
Pinker, have inundated us. 
Prinz’s reader-friendly book is appar-
ently geared to reach a similar audience.
However, in contrast to Pinker he pro-
poses that the pendulum of research lost
momentum after the great swing to
innateness, and is gaining energy in the
other direction. Since the 1970s, promi-
nent scientists such as Richard Lewontin
have battled naturists such as Richard
Hernstein, inspiring copious research con-
testing innate, genetically-dependent ten-
dencies. Plenty of studies reveal the short-
comings of naturism, and some strengthen
the idea that our environment shapes our
behavior more than our genetic program-
ming does. Prinz asks for fair airtime for
the other side, nurturism. He marshals
plenty of evidence to batter down the past
half-century of naturist ascendency in his
gentle, persuasive authorial voice. That
evidence seems to indicate that genetic dif-
ferences play a relatively insignificant role
in gender, sex/love, language, intelligence,
emotional make-up, morality, and mental
illness. Rather, culture and upbringing
contribute almost entirely to the acquisi-
tion of language; to the development of
basic knowledge such as distinguishing
colors, or life from nonlife; to one’s com-
parative intelligence level (if such a thing
can be measured); also to how women
behave contrasted with men; to whom you
are attracted to sexually; and even to the
types of emotions you experience. Some
facets of humanity, such as intelligence or
gender, have for decades now been argued
as being strongly environmental, even by
erstwhile naturists such as Noam Chom-
sky. Language acquisition, by contrast, has
long lain under the spell of genetics, ever
It remains unclear what ‘innate knowledge’
is: what are innate learning mechanisms in
infants, and what is ‘knowledge’? Children
respond early to eyes, smiles, frowns, as
though they have a sense of these features,
even if that sense is not propositional (‘that
smile means you’re happy’), and so is not
knowledge in a narrow sense. There is far
to go in this area, starting with an analysis
of what ‘knowledge’ is here.
Like physical illness, mental illness has an
epidemiology, and both types vary culturally.
Prinz convincingly traces manifestations of
mental illness to cultural differences, noting
that some pathologies arise only in some cul-
tures. Depression, for example, appears to be
strongly correlated with levels of industrial-
ization. But schizophrenia and bipolar disor-
der are more universal, and Prinz admits
that these may be grounded in genetically-
inherited predispositions. Prinz’s attempt to
trace the culturally variant pathologies to a
population’s learning to be mental ill – we in
industrialized societies learn to be depressed
– as a way to cope with (depressing?) circum-
stances, remains undemonstrated, possibly
begging the question. Furthermore, if the
culture is somehow unfit to supply a signifi-
cant proportion of its members with what
they need to thrive as human beings, what
is there to learn to supply, as one would
respond to scurvy by supplying vitamin C?
Morality seemingly differs cross-cultur-
ally too. Prinz claims, “we are not stuck
with the values we learned… we can
explore the possibility of moral reform”
(p.329). Yet how can we do this unless
there is some thing that morality is among
us all, such that it can be reformed, for the
group or the individual? 
The Human Being As Conflict Zone
The stance that human beings are
largely a construct of their culture as
opposed to their biology faces two major
problems: 1) It is as vague as saying, “We
are primarily constructs of our biology”;
and 2) By what criteria must one decide to
take one stance rather than the other?
Another important question is: What
drives one to choose one or other stance?
Is the choice a matter of ideology? 
Early on, Beyond Human Naturemen-
tions that some researchers (Matt Ridley,
as well as Richerson and Boyd) have called
for a truce between the two extremes of
nature vs nurture. But the author dismisses
the possibility of ‘reconciliation’, because
once they declare a truce, “combatants…
go on to emphasize one side at the expense
of the other… Scientific debates are rarely
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mentally ill far more personably by treat-
ing them individually than by forcing them
into biological or psychosocial programs.
Despite these concerns, the book is an
intelligent, winning, and brave incursion
into territory long dominated by genetic
determinism. Everyone interested in this
debate – particularly open-minded sup-
porters of genetic determinism – should
read this thoroughly researched work, and
be ready to meet its challenges. 
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“OUT OF THE CROOKED
timber of humanity, no
straight thing was ever
made.” Thus wrote Immanuel Kant (1724-
1804) in his Idea for a General History with a
Cosmopolitan Purpose (1784). The philosophy
professor from Königsberg, known for his
dense sentences in his three Critiques had a
Nebengeschäft, or sideline, as a public intel-
lectual. In this role he excelled in quotable
quips and witty puns such as the above. It
is this role which is the subject of Reidar
Maliks’ book Kant’s Politics in Context. 
Kant’s political philosophy commend-
ably being the subject of a book-length
study follows a perhaps belated recognition
of his work as a political thinker. To be
sure, others have engaged with Kant’s
political thought, above all Hannah Arendt,
yet as she said in her posthumous book Lec-
tures on Kant’s Political Philosophy (1992),
“the literature on Kant is enormous, but
there are very few books on his political
philosophy.” This is still largely the case.
Apart from Elisabeth Ellis’s Kant’s Politics:
Provisional Theory for an Uncertain World
(2008), we are still awaiting a comprehen-
sive work on Kant’s political philosophy. 
Maliks’ book does not however provide
us with an understanding of the unity of
Kant’s political thought. Indeed, it seems
the author is more interested in uncovering
Books
settled by compromise” (p.12). Apologists
for either nature or nurture plead their
side’s benignness, such as presenting their
perspective as the one from which we may
be able to cure mental illness. However,
Prinz’s language – ‘combatants’, ‘reconcili-
ation’, and my own, ‘truce’ – speaks of bel-
ligerence, power struggle; and a power
struggle speaks of a drive to control. There
is a vast, uncharted no-man’s-land between
the extremes of what genes or what the
environment shape in us, and here, every-
thing we are as humans seems to be at
stake. So who is to get to manipulate the
species to do or become what? Which side
is to control Homo sapiens? For instance, if
one side of the debate prevails, that side
may proceed to justify certain policies for
humanity upon the assumption that, say,
about 90% of what we are as humans (as if
that could be quantified) is determined by
nature (or nurture). Control of 90% of
what makes us human would allow a very
small margin of error for the controllers.
However, what if the compromisers are
right and human beings are about 50-50
shaped by nature and nurture? If one side
attempts to shape the human race in this
situation, the ratio makes the margin of
error quite large. Nature’s influence of one
dimension of humanity and nurture
another dimension grow so inextricable
and intricately mutually influential that
manipulating human destiny would be
nigh impossible, if not cruel and immoral.
Prinz speaks of the cultural plasticity that
humans would manifest if they were pri-
marily shaped by culture. However, if
humans are primarily gene-determined,
manipulating genes would afford our
species plasticity, while culture would be
relatively more fixed. Both views informed
prominent social experiments of the past
century: on the naturist side, the Nazi or
even U.S. Federal attempts to shape
humanity via eugenic manipulation; on the
nurturist side, the Soviet and Khymer
Rouge (among other culprits) attempts to
mold humanity via environmental, that is,
cultural, manipulation. Yet, if humans are
not determined by primarily either genes
or culture, but by an approximate 50-50
mix, any such attempts at shaping human-
ity, even to our benefit, would be almost
beside the point. Anthropological and psy-
chological inquiries might benefit us more
easily, via greater understanding. By better
understanding ourselves, far from being
‘trapped’ in biology or culture, we could
work at an individual level toward improv-
ing lives. For example, one could help the
Kant’s motivations and private views than
in understanding his remarkable and often
prophetic political philosophy. To be sure,
it is interesting to read how Kant engaged
in debates with his erstwhile pupil, the
romantic philosopher Johann Gottfried
Herder (1744-1803). While Kant clearly
was interested in contemporary issues, his
writings addressed other great minds. In
Theory and Practice (1793) he crossed
swords with Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).
But apart from Herder, Kant’s contempo-
rary intellectual adversaries were in an infe-
rior intellectual league. The likes of
Friedrich Bouterwek, Johann Benjamin
Erhart and Friedrich Schlegel have hardly
even become footnotes in the history of
political philosophy (although the latter
made a cameo appearance in Monty Python’s
‘Bruces’ Philosophers Song’). 
Was Kant a major political philoso-
pher? Notwithstanding the universally
acknowledged genius of the Critique of
Pure Reason (1781) and the perhaps equally
masterful brilliance of the Critique of Prac-
tical Reason (1788), political writings like
What is Enlightenment? (1784), Conjectures
on the Beginning of Human History (1796),
and even On the Perpetual Peace (1795), fall
short of the detail that characterised great
works of political philosophy such as
Plato’s Republic, Hobbes’ Leviathan, or
Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s Social Contract.
And yet, when patching together his writ-
ings, political and otherwise, we see
glimpses of the perspicacity that justly made
Kant famous for his sharp analytical mind.
It is as if we can see the contours of a not
yet chiselled-out statue in the unpolished
literary marbles he left behind.
What is so striking when reading about
Kant’s politics in Maliks’ book about him
is how modern he was, and how this most
German of thinkers departed from the
stereotype of the Teutonic Meisterdenker,
and instead came close to the ideal of the
British constitutionalist. This ideal is of “a
constitution allowing the greatest possible
human freedom in accordance with laws
which ensure that the freedom of each can
coexist with the freedom of all the others.”
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty (1859)? No
– Kant in Critique of Pure Reason. What is
even more remarkable is that this sentence
was written eight years before the French
revolutionaries penned the Déclaration des
droits de l’homme (1789), where a similar
phrase was used. It’s not surprising that
the poet Heinrich Heine called Kant the
philosopher of the French Revolution. 
This quote from his first Kritik is also a
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